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TILL DEATH DO US PART: CHIEF 
JUSTICES AND THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 
TODD C. PEPPERS* 
CHAD M. OLDFATHER** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The past several years have witnessed an extensive debate over the 
prospect of changing the institutional architecture of the Supreme 
Court.1  Spurred by, among other things, a dramatic increase in the 
 
* Henry H. and Trudye H. Fowler Associate Professor of Public Affairs, Roanoke 
College; Visiting Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law.  
** Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School.  We thank Paul Carrington 
and Alan Morrison for their thoughtful feedback. 
1. See, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006) [hereinafter REFORMING THE COURT] 
(collecting essays from a wide range of prominent scholars); Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative 
Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 
(2006); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life 
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006); Paul D. Carrington & Roger 
C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme 
Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009); Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 1313 (2007); David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: 
The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000); Patrick E. 
Higginbotham, A Few Thoughts on Judicial Supremacy: A Response to Professors Carrington 
& Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 637 (2009); Daniel J. Meador, Reining in the 
Superlegislature: A Response to Professors Carrington & Cramton, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 657 
(2009); Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the Powers 
and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006); 
Theodore W. Ruger, The Chief Justice’s Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1551 (2006); David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride 
Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710 (2007); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical 
Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 791 (2007); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for 
a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No: Changing 
the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1709 (2006); Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Age and Tenure of 
the Justices and Productivity of the U.S. Supreme Court: Are Term Limits Necessary?, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 161 (2006); Kevin T. McGuire, Are Justices Serving Too Long? An Assessment 
of Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, JUDICATURE, July–Aug. 2005, at 8. 
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Justices’ length of tenure,2 a substantial decrease in the number of cases 
decided by the Court each term,3 and perhaps a general sense of 
dissatisfaction with the Court’s institutional self-conception,4 the debate 
has centered on the possibility of imposing term limits on the Justices.  
But there are other possible reforms on the table as well, including most 
notably the “Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act of 2009,” which was 
spearheaded by Professors Roger Cramton and Paul Carrington5 and 
endorsed in whole or in part by at least fifty-four prominent lawyers and 
law professors.6  In addition to calling for Congress to create what would 
in effect be a term limit for Justices, the Act would create a Certiorari 
Division empowered to certify cases for the Court to hear, a term limit 
for the Chief Justice, and a mechanism for dealing with Justices who 
become unable to perform their duties.7 
 
2. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 1, at 771 (“We believe the American 
constitutional rule granting life tenure to Supreme Court Justices is fundamentally flawed, 
resulting now in Justices remaining on the Court for longer periods and to a later age than 
ever before in American history.” (footnote omitted)); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. 
Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court: An Introduction, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra 
note 1, at 3, 3 [hereinafter Carrington & Cramton, An Introduction] (“The undisputed factual 
predicate [for the symposium that produced the collection of essays in their book] is that 
justices today serve much longer than they did throughout our history.”). 
3. See Letter from George Alexander et al., to Hon. Joseph B. Biden, Jr., et al., at 13–14 
(Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://128.164.132.13/News/20092010Events/Nov09_Conference/Do
cuments/Supreme%20Court%20Proposals%20with%20signatoriesas%20of%2010-6-09.pdf 
[hereinafter Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act] (basing its proposal for reform of the 
certiorari process on the claim that the Court’s use of discretion to set its docket and thereby 
reduce the number of cases it hears “has resulted in a decline in the Supreme Court’s 
participation in the basic judicial tasks of judging cases, reconciling conflicts in interpretations 
of Congressional legislation in lower courts, and assuring adherence to proper procedures in 
mundane criminal cases”). 
4. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1549 (noting “the tendency toward ‘posterity worship’ 
and institutional self-aggrandizement of the current Court”); Carrington & Cramton, An 
Introduction, supra note 2, at 5.  Carrington and Cramton noted as follows:  
 
 Every informed observer, whether of the left, the right or the center, recognizes 
that the Court is now an institution exercising extraordinary power.  It is not 
surprising that justices relish the exercise of the great power the Court now 
possesses.  The celebrity that now renders sober justices as famous as rock stars, is 
flattering, enjoyable, stimulating, and provides many opportunities for travel and 
influence. 
Carrington & Cramton, An Introduction, supra, at 5. 
5. See Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act, supra note 3, at 3. 
6. See id. at 2–3. 
7. Id. at 5–6, 8, 11, 13–15. 
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In this Essay, we identify and explore an additional institutional 
difficulty, which bridges these last two components of the proposed Act.  
Prior commentary has chronicled the phenomenon of Justices serving 
beyond the point at which they are able to perform their duties.8  It has 
also addressed the unique powers and responsibilities of the Chief 
Justice, with some arguing that the administrative aspects of the role 
should be divorced from the effectively life tenure associated with a 
position on the Court.9  We wish to highlight a connection.  The unique 
powers and responsibilities of the center chair may make Chief Justices 
even more likely than Associate Justices to take their lifetime 
appointments literally, while at the same time increasing the potential 
consequences of a Chief Justice’s decision to do so in the face of 
physical or mental disability. 
Our analysis begins with the case of Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist, whose final illness is portrayed in detail in a recent book, 
Herman J. Obermayer’s Rehnquist: A Personal Portrait of the 
Distinguished Chief Justice of the United States.10  The image that 
emerges is of a proud and devoted man who remained dedicated to his 
job and the institution of which he was a part.  But Obermayer’s 
portrayal, considered alongside the press coverage as Rehnquist battled 
thyroid cancer, also raises the possibility that a Chief Justice with 
declining health might not be aware of or willing to acknowledge the 
extent to which his capacity to meet the demands of his job has 
diminished.  And while that potential exists for any Justice, we contend 
that the nature of the Chief Justice’s role creates not only greater cause 
for concern, but also an increased likelihood that the dynamic will arise.  
The history of Chief Justices at the end of their tenure, which we survey, 
is consistent with this thesis.  Although the numbers are small (there 
have been only seventeen Chief Justices), history suggests that 
occupants of the center chair are more likely to remain on the Court 
until the literal end of their life tenure.11  Whether a product of the job’s 
allure, the lack of anyone with clear responsibility for pressuring a Chief 
 
8. See generally Garrow, supra note 1 (providing a historical overview of mental 
decrepitude in the United States Supreme Court). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 137–142. 
10.  See HERMAN J. OBERMAYER, REHNQUIST: A PERSONAL PORTRAIT OF THE 
DISTINGUISHED CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (2009). 
11. See infra Part III. 
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Justice to resign, or other factors, the phenomenon provides further 
support to proposals to modify the nature of the office. 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows.  Part II recounts 
the story of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s final illness, drawing on 
Obermayer and press accounts.  Part III draws on two distinct bodies of 
scholarship—that relating to the illness and disability of Supreme Court 
Justices, and that relating to the unique role of the Chief Justice—to 
suggest that the concerns associated with disability are more acute in the 
case of the Chief Justice.  Part III further outlines reform proposals 
relating to the office of the Chief Justice, and suggests that our findings 
provide additional support to the contention that reform is in order.  
The case of the ailing Chief Justice Rehnquist is perhaps the best 
example of this much needed reform. 
II.  THE ILLNESS AND DEATH OF CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
A friend of the late Chief Justice for the last two decades of his life, 
Obermayer commenced his book project sparked by his impression that 
the news reports and obituaries written after the Chief Justice’s death 
contained few details about “his personality or his personal life.”12  
Obermayer absolves the media for failing to report about “Bill 
Rehnquist the man,” admitting that the Chief Justice “had worked hard 
to keep his private life—including his friendship with me—out of the 
limelight,”13 and promises his readers that he will introduce them to the 
private and human side of the Chief Justice.  Yet in doing so, 
Obermayer seeks to achieve more than adding to the store of amusing 
anecdotes: “Knowledge about the enthusiasms, biases, foibles and 
personal habits of the individuals who affect great events—including 
judicial events—contributes, often significantly, to understanding and 
evaluating them.”14  Regardless of whether the tales of the late jurist’s 
love of cigarettes, books, obscure quotations, small-stakes wagers, 
tennis, movies, crossword puzzles, geography, and the Green Bay 
Packers shed light on the Chief Justice’s judicial philosophy or his voting 
record in key constitutional cases, Supreme Court scholars will find a 
treasure trove of information in Obermayer’s tribute.15  For our 
 
12. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at ix. 
13. Id. at ix–x. 
14. Id. at x. 
15. Id. at 5, 8–9, 49, 119, 145, 155, 171. 
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purposes, Obermayer’s key contribution comes in the form of his 
detailing the Chief Justice’s final illness, which in turn provides a new 
opportunity to consider why Supreme Court Justices (especially Chief 
Justices) decide to take their lifetime appointment so literally. 
The story unfolds as follows.  On October 22, 2004, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist checked in to the Bethesda Naval Hospital.16  Suffering from 
a sore throat and a hoarse speaking voice, the Chief Justice believed 
that he would be undergoing minor surgery to remove a growth on his 
thyroid.17  Three days later, however, the Public Information Office of 
the United States Supreme Court announced that the Chief Justice had 
been diagnosed with thyroid cancer, had undergone a tracheotomy, and 
would be receiving radiation and chemotherapy treatments.  The 
statement added that the Chief Justice would be back at the Supreme 
Court for oral arguments scheduled on November 1.18  Although the 
type of thyroid cancer was never officially disclosed, many medical 
experts concluded that the Chief Justice had been diagnosed with 
inoperable anaplastic thyroid cancer—a rare type of thyroid cancer that 
is resistant to treatment and often fatal.19 
The Chief Justice returned to his home in Arlington, Virginia, on 
October 29, 2004, and, after failing to return to the Court on November 
1 as promised, issued a statement that “‘my plan to return to the office 
today was too optimistic.’”20  The Chief Justice reassured the public that 
he remained committed to carrying out his judicial responsibilities: 
“‘While at home, I am working on court matters, including opinions for 
cases already argued.  I am, and will continue to be, in close contact with 
my colleagues, my law clerks, and members of the Supreme Court 
staff.’”21  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s promise to remain fully engaged in 
the business of the Court was further evidenced by the news that he 
 
16. Linda Greenhouse & Katharine Q. Seelye, Rehnquist Treated for Thyroid Cancer, 
Supreme Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A1. 
17. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 215. 
18. Greenhouse & Seelye, supra note 16. 
19. See Lawrence K. Altman, Extended Absence of Chief Justice Hints at More Serious 
Cancer than He First Indicated, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A25; Lawrence K. Altman, 
Prognosis for Rehnquist Depends on Which Type of Thyroid Cancer He Has, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 26, 2004, at A16. 
20. Linda Greenhouse & Katharine Q. Seelye, Rehnquist Fails to Return, and 
Speculation Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at A1 (quoting directly a statement made by 
the Chief Justice). 
21. Id. (quoting directly a statement made by the Chief Justice). 
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continued to review certiorari petitions and to participate in cases 
scheduled for oral argument by reviewing hearing transcripts and case 
briefs.22  Despite these reassurances, discussion of retirement and the 
selection of a possible successor preoccupied the media in the 
subsequent weeks.23  The media also raised the question of how the 
Court should deal with the situation if Rehnquist were unable to 
perform his duties but refused to resign.24 
Although the aforementioned press releases gave the impression 
that the Chief Justice’s daily life remained relatively unaltered by his 
illness, Obermayer reveals that the Chief Justice was far weaker than 
the public realized.  Obermayer writes,  
 
Following his surgery, Bill was too weak to climb the eight 
steps leading to his front door, so he lived in the basement of his 
Arlington townhouse. . . .  [H]e never again sat at his dining 
room table, slept in his own bed, ate meals prepared in his 
kitchen or entertained family and friends in his tastefully 
decorated living room. 
Only in this arrangement could he continue to live in his own 
home.25 
 
The Chief Justice, however, was more than merely weak.  “He could 
no longer sustain himself.  He needed health care professionals nearby 
at all times.”26  In the weeks following his surgery, the Chief Justice had 
a tracheotomy tube (to assist with breathing) as well as “additional 
tubes and devices protruding from his neck” that made it hard for him 
to talk on the telephone.27  Moreover, the Chief Justice was fed through 
 
22. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Won’t Return to the Court This Year, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2004, at A11. 
23. See, e.g., David Stout, Rehnquist Delays Return to High Court, Raising New 
Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/01/politics/campaign 
/01cnd-rehn.html (“The announcement, a day before the election, was a fresh reminder that 
the next president will in all likelihood have an opportunity to nominate at least one member 
of the high court, and perhaps several.”). 
24. See Richard Willing & Liz Szabo, Illness a Delicate Issue for Court, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 2, 2004, at A3.  The first sentence of the article reads, “What if a Supreme Court justice 
became too sick to work, but didn’t want to step down?”  Id. 
25. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 217. 
26. Id. at 218. 
27. Id. at 219. 
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a stomach tube and never able to again eat solid food.28  “As if he were a 
baby, care providers fed him at set times each day.”29  The impact of the 
stomach tube quickly became apparent to Obermayer: 
 
From top to bottom, his weight loss became apparent.  His 
face became gaunt and jowly.  The skin below his chin, on either 
side of the tracheotomy tube, hung like a rooster’s wattles.  He 
moved his belt buckle in a notch every few weeks.  When the 
waist in a pair of trousers is four to five inches too wide, their ill 
fit tells a story in loud and clear tones.  He was wasting away—
rapidly.30 
 
As the Chief Justice slowly recovered from his surgery and 
underwent radiation and chemotherapy treatments, he struggled to 
maintain an active work schedule.  Nonetheless, he was unable to 
perform all of his duties, electing not to vote in all the cases that had 
been argued before the Court, but rather to participate only when 
necessary to break a tie.31  Observers at the time questioned whether this 
was a sign that Rehnquist had slipped.32  Obermayer writes that the 
treatments left him feeling “miserable,” and that “he pushed himself to 
keep up with his job.”33 
 
His law clerks, secretary and chief of staff came to his 
townhouse basement on a regular basis.  They reviewed with 
him transcripts, briefs[,] . . . court management questions[,] and 
his colleagues’ positions and opinions.  Even though he found it 
painful to talk or write, he dictated his view on pending cases, as 
well as letters and memos related to his job as the federal 
judiciary’s CEO.  This allowed him to participate in the Court’s 
work long before he was well enough to be driven to the 
Supreme Court Building and take his proper place at the center 
 
28. Id. at 218. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. See Charles Lane, Rehnquist Won’t Vote in Every Case Heard This Term, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at A8. 
32. Id. 
33. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 220. 
11-OLDFATHERPEPPERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  3:07 PM 
716 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:709 
 
of the bench.34 
 
In Obermayer’s opinion, what drove the Chief Justice in the first 
months after his diagnosis was his sense of duty and his love for the job.   
 
He[, the Chief Justice,] approached it with diligence and 
gusto as well as affection.  While duty was undoubtedly a factor 
in forcing himself to work hard[,] . . . probably more important 
was the fact that labor on court-related tasks was almost the only 
thing that brought joy into an otherwise dismal existence.35 
 
Because of the Chief Justice’s illness, Obermayer found that their 
social interactions were sharply curtailed.  While once the two friends 
freely visited over the phone and in person, they were now limited to 
short visits during the week and watched an hour of football together on 
Sunday.  During their visits, Obermayer sought ways of accommodating 
the Chief Justice’s struggles to talk without pain.  When they watched 
football, the friends would speak only during commercials so that the 
Chief Justice “did not have to sustain a lengthy conversation.”36  And 
while the old friends once engaged in lengthy debates, now Obermayer 
brought the Chief Justice clippings from such magazines as The 
Economist, the National Review, The New Republic, People, and Sports 
Illustrated.37  “It was another way of communicating in a manner that did 
not require him to take part in a lengthy conversation.”38 
In January of 2005, the Chief Justice finished his radiation 
treatments but continued with chemotherapy.39  The Chief Justice told 
Obermayer that the thyroid cancer “had been killed,” and he hoped that 
the subsequent chemotherapy treatments would reduce the size of the 
dead tumor and permit doctors to remove it.  “Much of the 
chemotherapy was unpleasant and debilitating, and it required a few 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 219. 
37. Id. at 220. 
38. Id. 
39. It is unclear whether the Chief Justice underwent radiation and chemotherapy 
simultaneously, although a close reading of Obermayer’s book indicates that likely the 
treatments were initially taken together, followed by another round of chemotherapy alone. 
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overnights in the hospital,” recounts Obermayer.40  While the Chief 
Justice “talked candidly about the chemo’s side effects,” Obermayer 
writes that “he believed that chemotherapy . . . would pay off.  I [felt] 
certain that he believed his tracheotomy tube would be removed during 
the summer and that by October he would be a whole person once 
again.”41 
Despite the ravages of his illness and the side effects of the 
chemotherapy, in January the Chief Justice slowly resumed some of his 
public duties.  Reports indicated that he was attending the regular 
conferences at the Supreme Court, but he did not attend oral arguments 
in either January or February because “the side effects of a tracheotomy 
and radiation therapy made it difficult for him to be on the bench for 
prolonged periods.”42  On January 20, 2005, the Chief Justice made a 
much publicized (but brief) appearance on the steps of the United 
States Capitol to swear in President George W. Bush.  Writing that it 
was impossible to determine whether the Chief Justice’s appearance at 
the inauguration “signified a last hurrah or a re-emergence after three 
months of intensive treatment for thyroid cancer,” New York Times 
reporter Linda Greenhouse stated that the Chief Justice walked with a 
cane, was “obviously not in robust health,” and spoke with “a firm if 
somewhat husky and unfamiliar-sounding voice.”43  The Chief Justice 
was one of the last individuals to arrive on the specially built inaugural 
platform, and Greenhouse reported that “[t]here was a slight smile on 
his face as he walked down the steps to his seat, whether from 
embarrassment at suddenly being the center of attention or from 
satisfaction at having accomplished a goal that some had speculated 
would be out of reach.”44  The Chief Justice departed immediately after 
administering the oath.45 
The Chief Justice finally returned to the Supreme Court bench in 
March of 2005, approximately five months after he was diagnosed with 
 
40. Id. at 227. 
41. Id. 
42. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Will Miss Tuesday Session, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2005, at A12. 
43. Linda Greenhouse, Ailing Chief Justice Makes Good His Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2005, at A11. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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thyroid cancer.46  Reports varied on the Chief Justice’s appearance.  
While the Associated Press described the Chief Justice as “frail,”47 
Greenhouse wrote that the Chief Justice appeared “quite fit” and was 
an active participant during oral argument.48  “The only noticeable 
indication of the thyroid cancer for which the [eighty]-year-old [C]hief 
[J]ustice has been treated since October was the unfamiliar quality of his 
voice, by turns reedy and husky,” reported Greenhouse.49 
On Monday, June 27, the Supreme Court ended its term.  Journalists 
present at the final session of the Court reported that the Chief Justice 
presided over the session with efficiency and humor, but had some 
trouble speaking.50  With the end of the Court’s term, the speculation 
over the Chief Justice’s possible retirement once again reached a 
fevered pitch.51  Reporters and politicians were not the only individuals 
awaiting a sign from the Chief Justice.  Faced with caring for an ailing 
spouse, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wanted to retire, but not if doing 
so would create multiple vacancies on the Court.52  Writes Greenhouse: 
“Finally, [Justice O’Connor] said, ‘I asked him, and he told me he really 
wanted to go another year and thought he’d be O.K.’”53  Based on the 
Chief Justice’s decision to postpone his retirement, on July 1, 2005, 
Justice O’Connor announced that she was leaving the Court.54 
The unanticipated retirement of Justice O’Connor pulled away the 
media spotlight, but not for long.  In the weeks that followed the end of 
October Term 2004, journalists took up permanent positions outside of 
 
46. See Charles Lane, Rehnquist Returns to the Bench, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at 
A1. 
47. Hope Yen, Ailing Rehnquist Returns to Bench After Five Month Absence, SE. 
MISSOURIAN, Mar. 22, 2005, at 5A. 
48. Linda Greenhouse, After Five Months’ Absence, Rehnquist Is Back in Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A20. 
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Anticipation of a Vacancy, But Silence Says Not Yet, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2005, at A16. 
51. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman & Linda Greenhouse, Suspense Builds and Rumors 
Fly as Rehnquist Remains Silent on His Health and Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at A9. 
52. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Rehnquist’s Stay on Court Forced O’Connor Out, ABC 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2816090&page=1. 
53. Linda Greenhouse, News Was Surprising to Colleagues on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
5, 2005, at A19. 
54. Greenburg, supra note 52; Richard W. Stevenson, O’Connor to Retire, Touching Off 
Battle over Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A1. 
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the Chief Justice’s home—often yelling questions at the Chief Justice as 
he left for work.55  In response to one question shouted by a reporter 
regarding his retirement plans, the Chief Justice shot back, “‘[T]hat’s for 
me to know and for you to find out.’”56  The media firestorm only 
increased in intensity after the Chief Justice was briefly hospitalized for 
a fever, resulting in the Chief Justice releasing a press statement on the 
evening of July 14 that was designed to end speculation that Rehnquist 
would be retiring shortly.57  “The statement said: ‘I want to put to rest 
the speculation and unfounded rumors of my imminent retirement.  I 
am not about to announce my retirement.  I will continue to perform my 
duties as [C]hief [J]ustice as long as my health permits.’”58 
It is unknown whether, at the time of his announcement, the Chief 
Justice knew that he was losing his battle with cancer.  Only two weeks 
later, however, Obermayer learned the grim news.  During a visit to the 
Chief Justice’s home on July 30, the Chief Justice told his long-time 
friend that his doctors had “discovered [that] the growth is coming 
back” and that he was stopping his chemotherapy treatments because of 
their ineffectiveness.59  “Bill’s matter-of-fact demeanor and terse 
statements could not hide his disappointment,” writes Obermayer.60  
“He had fought valiantly and painfully.  But he had failed.”61 
On August 4, the Chief Justice returned to a local hospital to be 
treated for a fever.62  According to Greenhouse, there were other 
hospitalizations during August that were not publicly disclosed.63  The 
end was near.  Obermayer paid his last visit to the Chief Justice on 
August 19.64  Only three weeks had passed since he had last seen 
Rehnquist, but Obermayer found himself facing a “visibly deteriorated” 
man whose voice had weakened and who now relied upon a walker to 
 
55. Linda Greenhouse, Despite Rumors, Rehnquist Has No Plans to Retire Now, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A10. 
56. See, e.g., id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 225. 
60. Id. at 227. 
61. Id. 
62. Lawrence K. Altman, Rehnquist Treated for Fever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005, at A11. 
63. Greenhouse, supra note 53. 
64. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 227. 
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move across the room.65  The two men spent a half hour talking about 
books and politics as well as Obermayer’s upcoming trip to Reykjavik.66  
As they parted, the Chief Justice reminded Obermayer to send him a 
postcard.67  With that, the friends said goodbye for the final time. 
The Chief Justice died at home, his family at his side, on September 
3, 2005.  He had so successfully hidden his terminal diagnosis that his 
colleagues were shocked by the news.68  The New York Times reported 
that the “[J]ustices indicated that they were as surprised as the rest of 
the country to learn late Saturday night that the [C]hief [J]ustice had 
died.”69  Retired Justice O’Connor referred to the Chief Justice’s death 
as “‘an earthquake for the court,’” while Justice David Souter was 
“flabbergasted” at the news.70  “[Justice Souter] said that while Chief 
Justice Rehnquist had appeared extremely weak when he returned to 
the bench in March after an absence of more than four months—and . . . 
wonder[ing] whether he would be able to finish the term—the [C]hief 
[J]ustice’s health had then appeared to turn around.”71  Added Souter: 
“‘He had an amazing few months and his decision at the end of the term 
not to retire had not seemed unreasonable.’”72  What might have 
explained the Justices’ surprise at the Chief Justice’s death was the fact 
that he had never talked about his illness or treatment with his fellow 
Justices.73 
On September 6, 2005, the late Chief Justice returned to the 
Supreme Court for the final time, when his former law clerks carried his 
pine casket into the Court’s Great Hall and carefully placed it on the 
Lincoln Catafalque.74  His funeral was held the next day at St. Matthew’s 
Cathedral in Washington, DC.  Eulogies were delivered by President 
George W. Bush, long-time friend and fellow Justice Sandra Day 
 
65. Id. at 228. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 229. 
68. Greenhouse, supra note 53. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Jan Crawford Greenburg, A Pine Coffin and Tearful Last Respects, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 
7, 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-09-07/news/0509070214_1_chief-justice-willia 
m-rehnquist-roberts-justices-antonin-scalia. 
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O’Connor, and several family members; and then the sixteenth Chief 
Justice of the United States was laid to rest in Arlington National 
Cemetery next to his late wife.75 
III.  WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM THE DEATH OF THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE? 
The final illness of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and his decision to not 
retire in the face of a terminal illness, is undoubtedly a poignant story of 
an individual who gave his last full measure to an institution that he 
loved.  There is, however, another dimension.  Placed into historical 
context, the episode illuminates an additional troubling aspect of 
lifetime tenure, namely, the lack of institutional norms regarding when 
Chief Justices should release the reins of power. 
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution states that all 
federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and 
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”76  In short, 
judges can be removed from office only by impeachment.  Alexander 
Hamilton explained in The Federalist Papers that such judicial 
independence is necessary if federal judges are to fulfill the critical role 
of protecting the Constitution from overreaching by the other branches 
of government and to protect minority rights from the momentary 
whims of the majority.77  It has proven to be an effective shield.  Since 
the ratification of the Constitution, only one Supreme Court Justice has 
been impeached: Associate Justice Samuel Chase, who was impeached 
by the House of Representatives in March of 1804, but later acquitted 
by the United States Senate.78  While House Republicans threatened to 
hold impeachment hearings for Associate Justice William O. Douglas 
(mainly due to the Justice’s messy personal life), no hearings ever 
materialized.79 
 
75. See OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 231, 233, 237, 239. 
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton). 
78. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC 
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 15–134 
(1992) (providing a historical background of the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase). 
79. See Tuan Samahon, Impeachment as Judicial Selection?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 595, 606–07 (2010).  As Samahon notes, “congressional surrogates” also threatened 
impeachment in the case of Justice Abe Fortas.  Id. at 605–06. 
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Historically, the primary danger associated with the substantial 
independence of the federal judiciary resulting from life tenure is a lack 
of accountability.80  Reduced to its essence, the strong form of this 
argument runs that the independence engendered by lifetime tenure in 
turn empowers federal courts to substitute their own policy preferences 
for those of duly-elected legislators.81 
Yet, as developed in the debates referenced above,82 lifetime tenure 
also raises concerns about the competence and ability of aging jurists.  
Indeed, the history of the United States Supreme Court is filled with 
examples of Justices who remained on the bench as their physical health 
deteriorated and their mental acuity declined.83  These concerns about 
judicial competency should be greater when it comes to Chief Justices.  
The Chief Justice bears a host of responsibilities beyond those of an 
Associate Justice, which increases the potential consequences of an 
inability to serve.  What is more, when compared to Associate Justices, 
Chief Justices show even a greater reluctance to leave the Supreme 
Court. 
Political scientist David N. Atkinson has documented Supreme 
Court Justices “at the end,” and his accounts offer an important warning 
that lifetime tenure comes with the additional cost of judicial infirmity.84  
Moreover, a close examination of the history suggests that the dangers 
of infirmity are more likely to arise with respect to Chief Justices.  
According to Atkinson’s research, only four of the last sixteen Chief 
Justices have retired from the Supreme Court while in good health: John 
 
80. Professor Saikrishna Prakash makes the point quite colorfully:  
 
Professors might be thought part of a conspiracy of silence regarding life tenure.  
We favor life tenure so much for ourselves that we are unwilling to confront its 
drawbacks for judges.  Indeed, no one should doubt that the conventional wisdom 
regarding life tenure is quite strong.  In rather bulky and recent law reviews 
dedicated to ‘Judicial Independence and Accountability,’ no academic seriously 
questioned whether life tenure serves any purpose.  Instead, most assumed the 
value of life tenure and noted its tension with accountability. 
Saikrishna Prakash, America’s Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 580 n.171 (1999) (reviewing 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)). 
81. Id. at 579. 
82. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
83. See generally Garrow, supra note 1. 
84. DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE 
END (1999). 
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Jay (Chief Justice from 1789 to 1795), Charles Evans Hughes (1930 to 
1941), Earl Warren (1953 to 1969), and Warren Burger (1969 to 1986).85  
Historically, the norm has been for the Chief Justice to die on the bench.  
John Marshall (1801 to 1835), Roger Taney (1836 to 1864), Salmon 
Chase (1864 to 1873), Morrison Waite (1874 to 1888), Melville Weston 
Fuller (1888 to 1910), Edward Douglass White (1910 to 1921), Harlan 
Fiske Stone (1941 to 1946), and Fred Vinson (1946 to 1953) all died 
while still holding the position of Chief Justice, while William Howard 
Taft (1921 to 1930), who was battling multiple health problems, resigned 
shortly before his death and Oliver Ellsworth (1796 to 1800) left the 
bench while facing a chronic health condition.86  While the second Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, John Rutledge (1795), was only a recess 
appointment, there is evidence to suggest that the Senate voted against 
confirming him based on concerns about his sanity.87 
Of the Chief Justices who died while on the bench, only the deaths 
of Harlan Fiske Stone and Fred Vinson were sudden and unexpected.88  
The remaining Chief Justices suffered from significant health problems 
over a sustained period of time, and their physical decline was known to 
Court insiders.  Oliver Ellsworth submitted his resignation after 
developing a painful kidney disorder.89  The last three years of John 
Marshall’s life saw the legendary Chief Justice battle what was likely 
liver cancer.90  Shortly before he died, friends described the seventy-
nine-year-old Marshall as “‘very emaciated, feeble [and] dangerously 
low,’” but alert and clear-headed.91  Two years before his death, a sickly 
Roger Taney had a “premonition of death” and said goodbye to his 
fellow justices.92  Still alive one year later, Roger Taney told a friend that 
he “‘hope[d] to linger along to the next term of the Supreme Court.’”93  
Linger he did, remaining on the Court until his death on October 12, 
1864, at the age of eighty-eight.  A stroke rendered Chief Justice Salmon 
Chase “barely able to function” during October Terms 1871 and 1872, 
 
85. Id. at 12–13, 113–15, 138–40, 150–52. 
86. Id. at 19–20, 28–31, 39–40, 51–54, 62–63, 79, 89, 96–97, 116–17, 120–21. 
87. Id. at 13–15. 
88. Id. at 116–17, 120. 
89. Id. at 19–20. 
90. Id. at 30–31. 
91. Id. at 30. 
92. Id. at 39–40. 
93. Id. 
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but a colleague noted that Chase’s daughters—including the politically 
ambitious Kate Sprague—“‘will never consent to his retiring to private 
life.’”94  In a letter written shortly after October Term 1872, Chase wrote 
that “‘I am too much of an invalid to be more than a cipher.  Sometimes 
I feel as if I were dead, though alive.’”95 Chase, who had once served as 
Abraham Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary and whose transparent political 
ambition resulted in his banishment to the Supreme Court, died two 
days later at the age of sixty-five. 
A nervous breakdown in 1885 started a downward spiral for Chief 
Justice Morrison Waite, and during one of his last appearances on the 
bench Attorney General Alexander Garland observed that “‘[i]t was 
evident to the observer death had almost placed its hand upon him.’”96  
Chief Justice Melville Weston Fuller remained in fairly good health until 
October Term 1909, when the diminutive jurist’s own declining health 
and the illnesses of other Justices made it difficult for him to carry out 
his duties.  After his death by heart attack on July 4, 1910, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote that the seventy-seven-year-old “‘Chief died at 
just the right moment, for during the last term he had begun to show his 
age in his administrative work.’”97 
Less than a week after the Court ended October Term 1921, an 
obese, seventy-six-year-old Edward Douglass White died after 
undergoing gallbladder surgery—thus fulfilling William Howard Taft’s 
dream of becoming the next Chief Justice.98  While Taft had lamented 
the fact that the aging and infirm White would never vacate the center 
chair, eight years later Taft would be bemoaning his own physical decay.  
Describing himself as “‘older and slower and less acute and more 
confused,’” Taft wrote to his brother that he “‘must stay on the court in 
order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting control.’”99  Plagued with 
cardiac disease, high blood pressure, insomnia, and anxiety during the 
last year of his life, William Howard Taft reluctantly resigned his 
position on February 3, 1930—only to die approximately one month 
 
94. Id. at 53. 
95. Id. at 54. 
96. Id. at 63. 
97. Id. at 79. 
98. Id. at 89. 
99. Id. at 96. 
11-OLDFATHERPEPPERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  3:07 PM 
2011–2012] TILL DEATH DO US PART 725 
 
later.100  While his successor, Charles Evans Hughes, would leave the 
Court in good health,101 Hughes’ successor, Harlan Fiske Stone, suffered 
a fatal cerebral hemorrhage while reading an opinion from the Supreme 
Court bench.102  The man selected to replace Stone, Fred Vinson, died of 
a sudden heart attack at the age of sixty-three.103 
As noted above, the clear historical pattern of dying while holding 
the center chair was broken by Earl Warren and Warren Burger, who 
both left the Court while in good health.  Ironically, it would be an avid 
student of Supreme Court history, William Rehnquist, who would re-
establish the controversial tradition of Chief Justices holding onto 
power after illness had clearly rendered them unable to perform their 
duties. 
When it comes to the Associate Justices, a slightly different pattern 
emerges, and it suggests that they are less likely to continue to serve 
despite faltering abilities.  In the nineteenth century, the majority of 
Associate Justices died in office.  But the numbers change dramatically 
in the twentieth century, during which only four Associate Justices died 
on the bench despite battling significant physical or mental infirmity 
(Rufus W. Peckham, Joseph R. Lamar, Benjamin Cardozo, and Robert 
H. Jackson).104  In contrast, a relatively large number of Associate 
Justices were forced from the bench due to illness or cognitive decline, 
including Horace Gray, Henry Billings Brown, William Moody, William 
R. Day, Mahlon Pitney, Joseph McKenna, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Sherman Minton, Harold Burton, Charles Whittaker, Felix Frankfurter, 
Hugo Black, John Marshall Harlan II, William O. Douglas, William J. 
Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall.105  In addition, and in further 
contrast to the Chief Justices, a substantial number of Associate Justices 
have left the bench while in relatively good health.  In the twentieth 
century, these Justices include George Shiras, John H. Clarke, Willis 
Van Devanter, George Sutherland, Louis Brandeis, James C. 
McReynolds, Owen J. Roberts, James Byrnes, Stanley Reed, Arthur 
Goldberg, Tom Clark, Abe Fortas, Potter Stewart, Lewis Powell, Byron 
 
100. Id. at 97. 
101. Id. at 113–15. 
102. Id. at 116–17. 
103. Id. at 120–21. 
104. Id. at 77–78, 87–88, 107–11, 121–22. 
105. Id. at 75–76, 80, 92–94, 100, 122–24, 126–33, 146–49, 154–60. 
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White, and Harry Blackmun.106  We can now add Sandra Day O’Connor, 
David Souter, and John Paul Stevens.  All in all, fewer than thirty 
percent of the Associate Justices who have served in the twentieth 
century have died in office. 
Although the numbers involved are too small to permit certain 
conclusions, their patterns nonetheless invite consideration of whether 
Chief Justices are more likely to die in office than Associate Justices, 
and what factors might lead to such a differential.  Of course, the 
decision to leave the Court is complex.  Atkinson suggests that there are 
a host of reasons why the Justices hang onto the bitter end: 
 
Supreme Court [J]ustices do not voluntarily leave office for 
the following reasons: (1) financial considerations; (2) party or 
ideology; (3) a determination to stay; (4) a sense of 
indispensability; (5) loss of status; (6) a belief that they can still 
do the work; (7) not knowing what else to do; and (8) family 
pressure to stay in office.107 
 
Political scientist Artemus Ward believes that politics primarily 
explains the retirement choices of modern Supreme Court Justices.  
Ward writes that while Justices’ retirement decisions were once 
“primarily concerned with institutional and personal factors” (including 
how to survive without a judicial pension, which would explain why so 
many Associate Justices died in office in the nineteenth century), that 
“generous retirement benefits coupled with a decreasing workload have 
reduced the departure process to partisan maneuvering.”108 
This does not explain, however, the tendency for more Chief Justices 
to die in office (or remain until illness forces their hand) than retire.  
The answer may lie in the unique role and powers of the Chief Justice.  
As we explore below, the Chief Justice role has evolved to encompass a 
much greater range of responsibilities than possessed by the Associate 
Justices,109 which may add to the allure of the job to such an extent that 
 
106. Id. at 75–76, 89, 104–06, 111–12, 115, 117–18, 125, 133, 136, 140–41, 149, 152–54, 
160–62. 
107. Id. at 7–8 (footnote omitted). 
108. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 11–12 (2003). 
109. See infra text accompanying notes 122–136. 
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its holders are more reluctant to leave.  But it may be another aspect of 
the Chief Justice role that is primarily responsible for the seeming 
differential in the likelihood that Justices will serve beyond their ability 
to do so effectively.  At various points in history, it has been the Chief 
Justice—often with the consensus of the Court—who has approached 
ailing Justices and suggested retirement.110  “The [C]hief [J]ustices have 
traditionally borne the principle burden of dealing with incapacitated 
colleagues, which has all too frequently proved to be trying,” observes 
Atkinson.111  “They have been least successful when a [J]ustice is 
reluctant to leave or determined to stay.  Although the [C]hief [J]ustice 
is primus inter pares, or first among equals, his principal power is that of 
persuasion.”112 
Atkinson provides three examples of the Chief Justice’s power of 
persuasion at work.  He writes that Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
felt “great consternation” about Justice Joseph McKenna’s dwindling 
mental acuity, and that the poor quality of Justice McKenna’s work 
product forced Taft to approach McKenna’s family (and eventually 
McKenna himself) in hopes of persuading him to resign.113  The Chief 
Justice, however, did not rely upon tact alone in pushing McKenna off 
the Court.  The Justices themselves had secretly decided to not decide 
any cases in which McKenna was the deciding vote.  Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes paid a similar visit to a ninety-year-old Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., but Holmes—unlike McKenna—graciously 
accepted the gentle nudge.114  Approximately fifty years later, Chief 
Justice Warren Burger followed Taft’s lead and used a similar tactic, 
when he convinced the other Justices (save a protesting Byron White) to 
allow him to schedule for re-argument cases in which ailing and 
confused Justice Douglas cast the deciding vote.115  Similar steps were 
taken to guarantee that Douglas would not determine on which cases 
 
110. See, e.g., Garrow, supra note 1, at 1018 (noting that once-Chief Justice Hughes 
acknowledged his “highly disagreeable duty” to approach Justice Holmes and suggest that he 
retire). 
111. ATKINSON, supra note 84, at 3. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 93–94. 
114. See Garrow, supra note 1, at 1017–18 (noting that “even what may have been the 
single most distinguished career in the entire history of the United States Supreme Court 
ended in an explicitly requested retirement because of increasing mental decrepitude”). 
115. ATKINSON, supra note 84, at 148–49. 
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the Court would grant cert.116 
Consider now Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision to remain in office.  
The standard explanations do not apply.  Clearly, partisan 
considerations cannot account for his decision: President George W. 
Bush had just been reelected to office, and the Chief Justice had several 
years in which to retire from the Supreme Court with the assurance that 
a Republican President would pick his successor.  Given the Chief 
Justice’s length of service, he could have retired at full salary—so 
monetary considerations cannot explain his behavior.  Moreover, 
Obermayer’s description of his late friend’s love for the Court,117 and his 
loneliness at the death of his wife,118 suggest that Rehnquist enjoyed his 
status as Chief Justice and did not relish the notion of retirement.  
Finally, the Chief Justice’s own press releases demonstrate that he felt 
that he was still capable of performing his duties. 
Yet Atkinson’s comments about the role of the Chief Justices in 
pushing colleagues to retire suggest another answer—there are no 
norms or historical precedent dictating that Associates Justices can, or 
should, approach a disabled Chief Justice and urge him to resign.  
Granted, the fact that the Chief Justice’s own colleagues did not know 
the extent of his illness meant that they did not have the relevant 
information necessary to make such an overture.  Even if they had, 
however, they would have faced several hurdles in doing so.  Because 
none of them had a formal administrative role, they would have faced a 
coordination problem in deciding to act, especially if they did not all 
agree that action was warranted.  Moreover, even if the Associate 
Justices were willing to discuss the Chief Justice’s disability with him, 
they lack the institutional levers to give the Chief Justice a necessary 
push.  Unlike Chief Justices Taft and Burger, the Associate Justices 
cannot schedule cases for re-argument or suspend the “rule of four” in 
order to divest an ailing Chief Justice of his vote.  Without such 
institutional norms and powers, the Associate Justices do not have the 
wherewithal to make a Chief Justice candidly and objectively assess his 
own disability. 
For all this, one might still ask whether judicial disability is that 
pressing of a concern.  To be sure, as Atkinson aptly demonstrates, 
 
116. Id. at 174–75. 
117. OBERMAYER, supra note 10, at 220. 
118. Id. at xiii, 169. 
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history is filled with examples of disabled Justices.  David Garrow has 
argued that the problem of “mental decrepitude” occurred more 
frequently during the twentieth century than the nineteenth and that it 
remains “a persistently recurring problem that merits serious 
attention.”119  Yet, as Ward Farnsworth has observed, the periods of 
time in the twentieth century during which Justices worked while 
suffering from some degree of mental deterioration constituted at most 
two percent of the aggregate service time of all the Justices during that 
century.120  Farnsworth further contends that the effects of disability are 
mitigated by the presence of the other Justices, as well as by the 
presence of a disabled Justice’s law clerks, “who generally can keep a 
chambers running without a drop-off in quality remotely commensurate 
with the [J]ustice’s drop-off in functionality.”121 
We are inclined to side with those who view mental and physical 
deterioration among the Justices as a matter of concern.  Even were we 
to accept the arguments of those who maintain that the problem is not 
significant, however, we believe that the Chief Justice presents a 
different case.  The reason why we should be concerned about the 
variation in retirement rates between the Associate and Chief Justices, 
and about the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a Chief 
Justice will continue to serve while disabled, has to do with the unique 
powers of the center chair. 
A Chief Justice has dual roles.122  The first, which is most visible, is 
his adjudicative role.  In this sense he is, as it is often expressed, “first 
among equals.”123  Although he enjoys some enhanced authority relative 
to his colleagues on the Court, primarily in the form of his opinion 
assignment power, he possesses only a single vote and accordingly can 
achieve little without the agreement of at least half of his colleagues.124  
As Theodore Ruger summarizes the matter, “The Chief Justice’s 
 
119. Garrow, supra note 1, at 995; see also Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 1, at 771–72 
(citing Garrow, supra). 
120. Ward Farnsworth, The Case for Life Tenure, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra 
note 1, at 251, 262. 
121. Id. 
122. See Ruger, supra note 1, at 1551–53 (distinguishing between the adjudicative and 
administrative roles of the Chief Justice); Judith Resnik & Theodore Ruger, Op-Ed, One 
Robe, Two Hats, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at A13. 
123. Ruger, supra note 1, at 1551. 
124. Id. at 1551–52. 
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adjudicative power is structured and channeled in ways very much like 
the other eight Justices on the Court, and, in a more general sense, is 
much like the authority of any judge on a multimember appellate 
tribunal.”125  Were this the sole component of his role, then we would 
have no greater reason to be concerned about disability of the Chief 
Justice than of Associate Justices.126 
It is the Chief Justice’s second role, as an administrator, that 
provides greater reason for concern.  As is widely appreciated, the Chief 
Justice has general administrative responsibility for the Supreme Court 
itself.127  That is no small job, for the Court employs over 450 people and 
has an annual budget in excess of sixty million dollars.128  But the role 
extends far beyond One First Street to encompass the entire federal 
judiciary and a number of committees, commissions, and other related 
entities.129  As Judith Resnik and her colleagues have shown, “the 
judiciary functions in many respects like an administrative agency, 
seeking to equip itself with the resources needed to provide the 
service—adjudication—that the Constitution and Congress require.”130  
As the head of this entity, the Chief Justice is, to outline just a sampling 
of his duties, responsible for overseeing the budget of the federal 
judiciary, conducting relations between the judiciary and Congress, 
appointing judges to some specialized courts, and authorizing requests 
for lower court judges to sit by designation on other courts.131 
These powers are considerable.  They also require a substantial 
investment of a Chief Justice’s time.  Indeed, in 1978, Chief Justice 
Burger remarked, “‘If the burdens of the office continue to increase as 
 
125. Id. at 1551. 
126. Some have indeed suggested that this is the most significant component of the Chief 
Justice’s role.  See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Opting for Change in Supreme Court Selection, and 
for the Chief Justice, Too, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 1, at 203, 216 (“In its single 
most important aspect, being [C]hief [J]ustice has no significance because the [C]hief, like all 
other [J]ustices, has one and only one vote.  There are ways in which the [C]hief exercises 
more power than his colleagues, but in the most important aspect of the job, he is only the 
first among equals.”). 
127. See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1588–91. 
128. Id. at 1588. 
129. See Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of the United States: 
More than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 59–62 (1984). 
130. Judith Resnik, Democratic Responses to the Breadth of Power of the Chief Justice, in 
REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 1, at 181, 190. 
131. Id. at 187–93. 
11-OLDFATHERPEPPERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  3:07 PM 
2011–2012] TILL DEATH DO US PART 731 
 
they have in the past years, it may be impossible for the occupant to 
perform all of the duties well and survive very long.’”132  Regardless of 
whether Burger was right about the capacity of a healthy Chief Justice 
to meet the obligations of the role, his comment underscores the 
potential significance of even a partial incapacitation.  The Chief Justice 
does not share his administrative responsibilities.  The institutional 
structures and mechanisms that might work to mitigate the effects of 
disability with respect to a Justice’s adjudicative role do not apply.133  
The Chief Justice as administrator need not persuade four of his 
colleagues in order to get his way.  Nor must administrative decisions be 
explained in written opinions released to the public and subject to 
critique.  In short, “the administrative powers of the [C]hief [J]ustice are 
neither officially shared nor constrained by obligations of accounting.”134  
The Chief Justice differs from most holders of executive power only in 
the extraordinary sense that the Chief Justice can, if he chooses, retain 
his powers for life.135  If he retains them into a period of disability, there 
is a substantial risk that they will be performed poorly, if they are 
performed at all.136 
Given the evidence concerning the risks of disability among 
Supreme Court Justices generally, coupled with an even greater risk that 
Chief Justices will serve beyond their full capacity to do so, reform is in 
order.  Several varieties have been proposed.  These include term 
limits,137 the creation of economic incentives to induce a Chief Justice to 
step down,138 and restructuring and reducing the administrative powers 
granted to the Chief Justice.139  As noted in the Introduction, the Four 
Proposals for a Judiciary Act of 2009 would impose a seven-year term 
 
132. Morrison & Stenhouse, supra note 129, at 58 (quoting a transcript of Justice Warren 
E. Burger’s Address to the Conference on the Role of the Judiciary in America on December 
14, 1978). 
133. See Resnik, supra note 130, at 193–94. 
134. Id. at 194. 
135. Id.  Professor Resnik points out that the Chief Justice’s lifetime tenure and “many 
grants of power contrast sharply with the authority of other executive officials.  Presidents 
have term limits.  Heads of independent agencies generally do as well.”  Id. 
136. See Garrow, supra note 1, at 995 (noting that the history of the Court “is replete 
with repeated instances” of justices participating in the work of the Court when colleagues 
and families of those same justices “had serious doubts about their mental capabilities”). 
137. See Resnik & Dilg, supra note 1, at 1645–46. 
138. See id. at 1646–47. 
139. See id. at 1647–48; Swaine, supra note 1, at 1711–13. 
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limit on the office of the Chief Justice.140  A separate provision would 
expressly impose a duty on all of the Justices “to voluntarily retire when 
[they are] no longer able fully to perform the duties of the office held.”141  
In the case of the disability of the Chief Justice, the Act would place a 
duty on the Associate Justices to report the disability to the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, which would in turn be obligated to 
start a process in which the chief judges of the circuit courts of appeals 
consider whether there is “substantial evidence” that the Chief Justice 
“is not able to perform the duties of the office” and, if they so find, to 
“report that finding to the Judiciary Committee of the United States 
House of Representatives.”142  Detailed consideration of the 
appropriateness and constitutionality of these proposed reforms is 
beyond the scope of our mission in this Essay, and in any event has been 
extensively debated elsewhere.143  We seek instead simply to underscore 
the point that consideration of reform is necessary in the specific context 
of the Chief Justice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Lifetime tenure comes with several costs.  The case of Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist illustrates both a familiar and an overlooked 
aspect of those costs.  The familiar costs arise out of the phenomenon of 
Justices who “linger” after their physical or mental health has failed 
them.  The overlooked costs are specific to the office of the Chief 
Justice.  When combined with the fact that the Associate Justices have 
neither the formal power nor the support of institutional norms to 
 
140. See Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act, supra note 3, at 11.  Section 5 of the 
proposed Act provides as follows:  
 
A Chief Justice appointed after the date of this enactment shall be appointed and 
may be reappointed by the President with the consent of the Senate for a term of 
seven years and an additional time until the next opportunity for the President to 
appoint a new Justice arises or until resolution of any pending impeachment over 
which the Chief Justice must preside. 
Id. 
141. Id. at 8. 
142. Id.  The Act would impose a similar obligation on the Chief Justice to report an 
Associate Justice’s disability to the Judicial Conference.  But in that case the Chief Justice 
would also have an independent obligation to advise the disabled Associate Justice to 
retire.  Id. 
143. See generally, e.g., REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 1. 
11-OLDFATHERPEPPERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  3:07 PM 
2011–2012] TILL DEATH DO US PART 733 
 
nudge the Chief Justice into retirement, we should not be surprised to 
find that almost all Chief Justices die in office—many long after their 
physical or mental powers have waned.  Whatever one’s view on the 
significance of declining performance amongst Associate Justices, the 
problem is undoubtedly more acute for Chief Justices.  We take no 
position here on the question of how best to counter the enduring allure 
of the center chair.  But we are confident of this: Given the important 
role that the Chief Justice plays, not only as the head of the Supreme 
Court but as the leader of the federal judiciary, the historical practice of 
Chief Justices dying with their proverbial boots on should end. 
 
